Scriber v. Consumers Energy: Intentional-Damage Allegations Can Keep a Vehicle Property-Damage Claim Outside the No-Fault Act
By Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Esq. The Seva Law Firm
Case: Verlin Scriber v. Consumers Energy Corporation, No. 376788 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2026) (Unpublished)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Panel: Cameron, P.J., and Maldonado and Wallace, JJ.
Decision: Reversed and Remanded — Per Curiam
Lower Court: Hillsdale Circuit Court, Case No. 24-000448-NZ
- Introduction
In Scriber v. Consumers Energy, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the boundary between property protection insurance under the no-fault act and a traditional tort claim for intentionally caused property damage. The Court reversed summary disposition because the property owner’s complaint alleged that a utility repair crew intentionally drove trucks over trees to create a new access path. At the pleading stage, that allegation had to be accepted as true and was sufficient to invoke the no-fault act’s intentional-harm exception. The decision illustrates how the characterization and pleading of vehicle-related property damage can determine both the available remedy and the limitations period.
- Facts
A Consumers Energy transformer malfunctioned in February 2022, causing power outages near Verlin Scriber’s property. Consumers dispatched a repair crew to reach a transformer on neighboring land. Scriber alleged that the crew drove through his property and damaged multiple trees.
In July 2024, Scriber sued for trespass and negligence. Consumers argued that the claims were really claims for property damage arising from use of a motor vehicle. If so, the no-fault act governed and its one-year limitations period barred the lawsuit. Scriber conceded the negligence claim but maintained that his trespass claim fell within MCL 500.3135(3)(a), which preserves tort liability for intentionally caused harm to persons or property. A trespass claim falling within that exception would be governed by the general three-year limitations period and would be timely.
The complaint specifically alleged that the repair crew intentionally drove its trucks directly over Scriber’s trees to create a new access path. The trial court nevertheless granted summary disposition because Scriber had not produced sufficient evidence that the crew intended to damage the trees.
- Issues
The central issue was whether Scriber’s pleaded allegation of intentional vehicle-caused property damage was enough to bring his trespass claim within MCL 500.3135(3)(a) and avoid dismissal under the no-fault act’s one-year limitations period.
The Court also considered whether Scriber had to produce evidence proving the crew’s intent at the summary-disposition stage when Consumers had offered no documentary evidence contradicting the complaint’s factual allegation.
- Holding
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The no-fault act generally abolishes tort liability for damages arising from the use of a motor vehicle and ordinarily provides property protection benefits for accidental damage to tangible property. But MCL 500.3135(3)(a) preserves tort liability for intentionally caused harm.
Scriber’s allegation that the crew intentionally drove directly over his trees to create an access route brought the trespass claim within that exception. Under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), the trial court was required to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true unless documentary evidence contradicted them. Consumers offered no such evidence.
By requiring Scriber to prove intent at that stage, the trial court improperly shifted the burden. Whether the evidence ultimately establishes the crew’s actual intent may be litigated later, but the pleaded allegation was sufficient to survive the motion. Because the intentional-harm exception potentially applied, the general three-year limitation period could govern instead of the no-fault act’s one-year period.
- Conclusion
The Court reversed the dismissal of Scriber’s trespass claim and remanded for further proceedings. It did not decide whether the crew actually intended the damage or whether Consumers had a legal right to enter the property. It held only that the complaint adequately pleaded intentional harm and therefore could not be dismissed as untimely at that stage.
- What Does This Mean for Our Clients?
Vehicle-related property damage is not always confined to no-fault benefits. When harm is intentionally caused, MCL 500.3135(3)(a) may preserve a tort claim outside the no-fault system.
The distinction affects filing deadlines. Accidental property-protection claims and intentional tort claims may be governed by very different limitations periods. Waiting to determine the correct theory can jeopardize an otherwise valid claim.
Specific factual allegations matter. A complaint should explain who acted, what was done, and why the conduct was intentional. A court generally must accept those well-pleaded facts at the early pleading stage unless contrary documentary evidence is presented.
Surviving dismissal is not the same as proving the case. Scriber must still develop evidence of intent on remand. The decision preserves his opportunity to do so; it does not decide the ultimate facts.
If a vehicle has damaged your home, land, landscaping, or other property, contact The Seva Law Firm promptly. We can evaluate whether the no-fault act applies, whether an exception preserves a tort claim, and which deadline controls.
Pratheep Sevanthinathan is the owner and managing attorney of The Seva Law Firm, located at 100 W. Big Beaver Rd, Suite 500, Troy, MI 48084. He can be reached at (248) 385-5704.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is different, and past results do not guarantee future outcomes.
In Scriber v. Consumers Energy, the Michigan Court of Appeals revived a trespass claim alleging that a utility crew intentionally drove trucks over a property owner’s trees to create an access path.
Michigan’s no-fault act generally governs accidental property damage arising from motor-vehicle use and imposes a one-year filing deadline. But MCL 500.3135(3)(a) preserves tort liability for intentionally caused harm. Because the complaint specifically alleged intentional conduct, the court had to accept that allegation as true at the pleading stage unless documentary evidence contradicted it. Consumers offered none. The trial court therefore erred by demanding proof of intent and dismissing the case.
The ruling does not prove the crew intended the damage; it gives the owner the opportunity to develop that evidence. The distinction matters because an intentional tort may fall under a three-year deadline instead of the no-fault act’s one-year period.
If a vehicle damaged your land or other property, call The Seva Law Firm promptly at (248) 385-5704. We can identify the right claim and filing deadline.
