Barnett v. City of Detroit 

Barnett v. City of Detroit: Court of Appeals Reverses Denial of Governmental Immunity, Holds That Bus Braking to Avoid Collision Is a Normal Incident of Travel

By Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Esq. The Seva Law Firm

Case: Barnett v. City of Detroit, No. 375164 (Mich. Ct. App. July 23, 2026) (Unpublished)

Court: Michigan Court of Appeals

Panel: Mariani, P.J., and O’Brien and Wallace, JJ.

Decision: Reversed and Remanded — Per Curiam

Lower Court: Wayne Circuit Court, Case No. 23-013543-NI

Read the full opinion here

1. Introduction

In Barnett v. City of Detroit, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition for the City of Detroit and the Detroit Department of Transportation (DDOT) on a third-party automobile negligence claim brought by a bus passenger who was injured when the driver braked hard to avoid a collision. The Court held that the bus driver’s emergency braking was a “normal incident of travel” under longstanding Michigan law, and that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the braking constituted negligent operation of the bus. The decision reaffirms the high bar that plaintiffs face when bringing third-party tort claims against governmental entities under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, while also clarifying an important distinction between the causation standards for governmental immunity claims against entities versus individual government employees.

2. Facts

On October 19, 2023, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Michelle Barnett boarded a City of Detroit bus carrying takeout food and approximately $200 in groceries loaded in a two-wheeled cart. She went to the row of seats immediately behind the driver, flipped up a seat to accommodate her shopping cart, and was in the process of sitting down in the adjacent seat.

Approximately three minutes after she boarded, while Barnett’s “buttocks [were] on the bench” but she had not yet fully settled into her seat, the bus driver hit the brakes hard twice in rapid succession. Barnett testified the braking happened “back to back . . . boom, boom, boom, boom.” She was thrown from her seat onto the floor along with her overturned cart and food. She briefly lost consciousness and sustained injuries to her ankles, knees, left side, back, neck, and head.

The bus driver testified that he was traveling westbound on Grand River Avenue at approximately 20 miles per hour, approaching the intersection with Evergreen Road, when a car from the adjacent lane suddenly cut across his lane to make a right turn. He pumped the brakes twice to avoid a collision with that vehicle. The driver testified that he believed he was operating the bus safely.

Barnett’s own view was obstructed, but fellow passengers told her the driver braked to avoid a car that had cut in front of the bus. When asked whether the driver did anything wrong, Barnett testified: “I don’t know how to answer that, how he could have been wrong, to be perfectly honest.”

Barnett filed suit against the City of Detroit, DDOT, and the bus driver, asserting claims for PIP benefits and third-party automobile negligence. Her third-party claim alleged the City and DDOT were liable under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405. The bus driver was never served and was dismissed without prejudice.

The City and DDOT moved for summary disposition, arguing that the bus driver’s braking was a normal incident of travel and did not constitute negligent operation. The trial court denied the motion without explanation. The City and DDOT appealed as of right.

3. Issues

The central issue was whether the bus driver’s emergency braking — pumping the brakes twice to avoid a collision with a car that suddenly cut across the bus’s lane — constituted negligent operation of the bus under MCL 691.1405, or whether it was a “normal incident of travel” that cannot support a negligence claim.

A secondary issue was whether the plaintiff adequately pleaded her claim in avoidance of governmental immunity.

The Court also addressed an important point of law regarding the causation standard: whether a plaintiff bringing an MCL 691.1405 claim must show that the negligence was “the proximate cause” (the gross negligence standard) or merely “a proximate cause” (the ordinary negligence standard).

4. Holding

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the City of Detroit and DDOT on the third-party negligence claim.

On the pleading issue, the Court found that Barnett adequately pleaded an MCL 691.1405 claim. Her complaint alleged negligent operation of the bus with specific factual allegations and identified the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. This part of the defense’s argument failed.

On the merits, however, the Court held that Barnett failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the bus driver negligently operated the bus. The Court relied on a long line of Michigan precedent holding that sudden stops, jerks, and jolts are “normal incidents of travel” on public transportation:

• Seldon v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation, 297 Mich App 427 (2012): “Absent evidence of other negligence pertaining to the operation of a bus, a plaintiff bus passenger may not recover for injuries sustained when the bus suddenly stopped because such stops are normal incidents of travel.”
• Getz v. Detroit, 372 Mich 98 (1963): “Sudden jerks or jolts in stopping to let off and take on passengers and in starting are among the usual incidents of travel.”
• Russ v. Detroit, 333 Mich 505 (1952): A sudden stop does not create liability.

The Court noted that the bus driver was responding to an emergency — a car suddenly cutting across his lane — and that braking to avoid a collision was exactly what a reasonable operator would do. Barnett herself could not say the driver did anything wrong. She provided no evidence of excessive speed, inattention, or any other form of negligent operation. The mere fact that she was injured did not, by itself, establish negligence.

The Court also acknowledged but did not apply the exception recognized in Ottinger v. Detroit United R., 166 Mich 106 (1911), and Getz, which holds that a carrier may have a duty to wait for a passenger to be seated if there is “some special and apparent reason to the contrary,” such as the passenger appearing “frail, weak, infirm or in any wise disabled.” Barnett did not argue this exception applied, and the braking incident occurred approximately three minutes after she boarded — at which point she was already substantially seated.

On the causation standard, the Court made an important clarification. The City and DDOT had argued that Barnett needed to show the negligence was “the proximate cause” of her injuries. The Court corrected this, noting that “the proximate cause” is the standard for gross negligence claims against individual government employees under MCL 691.1407(2), while the standard for MCL 691.1405 claims against governmental agencies is merely “a proximate cause” — the ordinary negligence standard. Despite applying the more plaintiff-friendly causation standard, the Court still found Barnett’s claim failed because she could not establish any negligence in the first place.

The Court did not disturb Barnett’s PIP claim, which was not at issue in this appeal.

5. Conclusion

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition and remanded for entry of an order granting partial summary disposition with prejudice to the City of Detroit and DDOT on Barnett’s third-party automobile negligence claim under MCL 691.1405. The Court held that the bus driver’s emergency braking to avoid a collision was a normal incident of travel and that Barnett failed to present evidence of negligent operation. Barnett’s PIP claim was unaffected by the ruling.

6. What Does This Mean for Our Clients?

This decision is important for anyone injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a government-owned vehicle, and it highlights several key points:

Third-party tort claims against government buses are difficult — but your PIP claim survives. The Court dismissed Barnett’s negligence claim against the City and DDOT, but it specifically noted that her PIP claim was not affected. Under Michigan’s no-fault system, PIP benefits — including allowable expenses for medical treatment, attendant care, and wage loss — are available regardless of who was at fault. Even when a third-party tort claim fails, your first-party PIP claim remains intact.

“Normal incidents of travel” is a high bar to overcome. Michigan courts have consistently held that sudden stops, jerks, and jolts on public transportation are things passengers must anticipate. To succeed on a negligence claim, you need evidence of something more — excessive speed, inattention, operation in violation of traffic laws, or some other form of negligent operation beyond the braking or jolting itself.

The causation standard matters. The Court clarified that claims under MCL 691.1405 (motor vehicle exception) use an ordinary “a proximate cause” standard — not the heightened “the proximate cause” standard that applies to gross negligence claims against individual government employees. This is a favorable standard for plaintiffs, even though it was not enough to save Barnett’s claim in this case.

Document everything after a bus accident. If you are injured on a public transit vehicle, document the circumstances as thoroughly as possible — what the driver was doing before the incident, whether there was excessive speed, whether the driver was distracted, and whether you had any physical condition that should have prompted the driver to wait for you to be seated. These details can make the difference between a successful and unsuccessful claim.

If you have been injured on a city bus or other government vehicle, contact The Seva Law Firm. While third-party claims face significant hurdles under governmental immunity, your PIP benefits are protected, and there may be other avenues for recovery depending on the specific facts of your case.

Pratheep Sevanthinathan is the owner and managing attorney of The Seva Law Firm, located at 100 W. Big Beaver Rd, Suite 500, Troy, MI 48084. He can be reached at (248) 385-5704.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is different, and past results do not guarantee future outcomes.