August 19, 2026
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seva firm
Scriber v. Consumers Energy: Intentional Property Damage Allegations Can Keep a Claim Outside No-Fault’s One-Year Deadline
By Pratheep Sevanthinathan, Esq. The Seva Law Firm
Case: Verlin Scriber v. Consumers Energy Corporation, No. 376788 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2026) (Unpublished)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Panel: Cameron, P.J., and Maldonado and Wallace, JJ.
Decision: Reversed and Remanded — Per Curiam
Lower Court: Hillsdale Circuit Court, Case No. 24-000448-NZ
1. Introduction
Michigan’s no-fault act generally replaces tort liability for accidental property damage arising from the use of a motor vehicle with property protection insurance benefits. Those benefits are subject to a short one-year limitations period. But the act expressly preserves tort liability for intentionally caused harm to persons or property. In Scriber v. Consumers Energy, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a property owner’s allegation that a utility crew intentionally drove over his trees to create an access path was enough to invoke that exception at the pleading stage. Because Consumers Energy offered no documentary evidence contradicting the allegation, the trial court improperly required the property owner to prove intent before discovery and trial.
2. Facts
In February 2022, a transformer maintained by Consumers Energy malfunctioned and caused power outages near Verlin Scriber’s property. Consumers Energy sent a repair crew to restore service. According to Scriber’s complaint, the transformer was on neighboring property, and the crew intentionally drove its trucks directly over trees on Scriber’s land to create a new route to the pole.
Scriber sued in July 2024 for trespass and negligence. Consumers Energy argued that the claims were really claims for property damage arising from the use of a motor vehicle. On that theory, the no-fault act governed and its one-year limitations period, MCL 500.3145(5), barred the lawsuit.
Scriber responded that his trespass claim fell within MCL 500.3135(3)(a), which preserves tort liability for intentionally caused property damage. If that exception applied, the general three-year limitations period for trespass governed and his lawsuit was timely. Scriber conceded the negligence claim, leaving the trespass claim as the issue on appeal.
The trial court granted summary disposition to Consumers Energy because it believed Scriber had not produced enough evidence that the crew intended to damage the trees.
3. Issues
The central issue was whether Scriber’s trespass claim was governed by the no-fault act’s one-year limitations period or instead fell within the act’s intentional-harm exception and the general three-year limitations period.
The related procedural issue was whether, in response to a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), Scriber had to produce evidence proving the crew’s intent even though his complaint specifically alleged intentional conduct and Consumers Energy had submitted no documentary evidence contradicting that allegation.
4. Holding
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. It held that Scriber adequately pleaded facts bringing his trespass claim within the no-fault act’s exception for intentionally caused harm to property.
The Court emphasized that motions under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8) require courts to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Under (C)(7), those allegations remain controlling unless documentary evidence contradicts them. Scriber specifically alleged that the crew “intentionally drove their trucks directly over” his trees to create an access path. Consumers Energy did not submit evidence contradicting that allegation. Instead, it argued that Scriber had not yet supported the allegation with proof.
That argument improperly shifted the burden to Scriber. At this stage, he was required to plead facts supporting the exception, not prove the crew’s actual intent. Whether he can ultimately establish intentional harm is a later factual question.
Because the pleaded facts placed the claim within MCL 500.3135(3)(a), the trial court could not dismiss it as barred by the no-fault act’s one-year deadline. The claim could proceed under the three-year period applicable to trespass.
5. Conclusion
The Court of Appeals reversed the summary-disposition order and returned the case to the Hillsdale Circuit Court. It did not decide whether the crew actually intended to damage Scriber’s trees or whether Consumers Energy had a legal right to enter the property. It held only that Scriber’s detailed allegation of intentional conduct was legally sufficient at this stage and could not be rejected merely because he had not yet proved it.
Although unpublished, Scriber is a useful reminder that the label placed on a claim does not determine whether the no-fault act controls. Courts must examine the facts alleged, the applicable statutory exception, and the procedural posture before imposing the act’s shorter limitations period.
6. What Does This Mean for Our Clients?
Intentional vehicle-related property damage may remain actionable in tort. Not every loss involving a vehicle is confined to no-fault property protection benefits. MCL 500.3135(3)(a) preserves tort liability when harm to a person or property was intentionally caused.
The applicable deadline can turn on how the harm occurred. Accidental property damage governed by the no-fault act may face a one-year deadline, while an intentional-damage trespass claim may have a three-year limitations period. Prompt legal review is essential because missing the correct deadline can end an otherwise valid claim.
A well-pleaded complaint matters. Scriber survived dismissal because he alleged specific intentional conduct: the crew deliberately drove over his trees to make an access route. General conclusions may not be enough. The complaint should identify the acts supporting an intentional-harm theory.
A plaintiff does not always have to prove the entire case at the pleading stage. When a defendant offers no evidence contradicting a well-pleaded allegation, it cannot force the plaintiff to prove that allegation merely by filing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) or (8).
If your property was damaged by a vehicle, or an insurer or defendant is relying on the no-fault act to argue that your claim is untimely, contact The Seva Law Firm. The facts surrounding how the damage occurred may determine both the remedy and the deadline.
Pratheep Sevanthinathan is the owner and managing attorney of The Seva Law Firm, located at 100 W. Big Beaver Rd, Suite 500, Troy, MI 48084. He can be reached at (248) 385-5704.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Every case is different, and past results do not guarantee future outcomes.
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Michigan’s no-fault act generally covers accidental property damage arising from the use of a motor vehicle and imposes a short one-year deadline. But what if the damage was intentional?
In Scriber v. Consumers Energy, a property owner alleged that a utility repair crew intentionally drove its trucks over his trees to create an access path to a transformer. Consumers Energy argued that the no-fault act controlled and that the lawsuit, filed more than one year later, was time-barred.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed dismissal. MCL 500.3135(3)(a) preserves tort liability for intentionally caused harm to property. Because the complaint specifically alleged intentional conduct—and Consumers Energy submitted no evidence contradicting it—the owner did not have to prove the crew’s intent at the pleading stage. His trespass claim could proceed under the general three-year limitations period.
The takeaway: not every vehicle-related property claim is limited to no-fault benefits, and the correct filing deadline may depend on whether the damage was accidental or intentional. Specific facts and careful pleading matter.
If vehicle-related damage has affected you, contact The Seva Law Firm at (248) 385-5704 for a case review.